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DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE "WAR"
AGAINST TERROR
Douglass Cassel*
Safeguarding human rights in our "war" against terrorism is both
the right and the smart thing to do.
It is right because human rights embody our fundamental values as
Americans and as Christians. Our Constitution stands for freedom; our
Creator teaches us to respect the God-given dignity of each human
soul. Christians are called to cherish human dignity, not only of inno-
cents, and not only of captives in war whose status as combatant or
civilian may be uncertain, but also of cardinal sinners, the terrorists
themselves. Christ Jesus teaches us to hate the sin, but somehow to
bring ourselves to love the sinner. Living up to this counter-intuitive
teaching is not easy for mere mortals.
Fortunately, even if we may find it difficult to love terrorists in our
hearts, experience teaches that respecting their human rights in our
practice is the smart thing to do. Experience teaches that what little
advantage we gain from brutality and lawlessness is not worth losing
the moral high ground that alienates friend, foe, and neutral bystander
alike.
The moral high ground is a front that matters in the "war" against
terrorism. A1-Qaeda's main targets are not buildings and bodies, but
hearts and minds. They toppled the World Trade Center and murdered
three thousand people,' not to put Wall Street out of business, but to
send a message to millions worldwide. 9/11 had the effect of terroriz-
ing some populations while rousing an indignant spirit in others.
To win this "war," we must be at least as smart as our foes. The
terrain we must seek to conquer is not mainly on the ground, but in the
human mind. When Americans humiliate Iraqi prisoners at Abu
* Lilly Endowment Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. This article
originally was a presentation at Regent University School of Law, Nov. 18, 2005;
article updated February 6, 2006.
I Bob Minzesheimer, Even Fiction Can't Escape 9-11's Shadow, USA
TODAY, June 6, 2002, at ID (Life).
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Ghraib, they not only commit crimes, they also hand the terrorists a
propaganda victory of immense proportion.2 We must be smarter. We
must understand that only by showing a determined respect for human
rights can we convince the world to stand with us. Moreover, by so
doing, we will confirm that we see the soul of every child of God,
friend or foe, as no less sacred than our own.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Properly understood, many disputes over human rights in the
"war" against terrorism are not only about the rights of prisoners, but
also about maintaining the rule of law that protects us all from tyr-
anny. Americans have more to lose than the terrorists do if we allow
the rule of law to unravel.
Our nation's founders understood that law must restrain power.
From their study of the history of ancient Greece and Rome, and of
modem Britain and continental Europe, they instinctively embraced
the contemporaneous dictum of Lord Acton that "[p]ower tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
3
In drafting our Constitution and establishing our system of laws,
the framers erected a series of legal and institutional bulwarks to curb
the inevitable tendency of the executive--especially in stressful
times-toward excess. Today these safeguards seem so obvious that
Americans take them for granted. However, they were not easily won
and, as we are now witnessing once again, they are not easily kept.
In brief, the founders designed the following to safeguard our hu-
man rights:
* Constitutionalism. Our government and our President have
only the power conferred by an agreed, binding charter.
4
2 G. Robert Hillman, Hussein in Briefs Riles Arabs, Tabloid Photo Angers
Many Still Repulsed by Abu Ghraib, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 21, 2005, at IA
(News).
3 Letter from Lord John Acton to Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in 2
SELECTED WRITINGS OF LORD ACTON: ESSAYS IN THE STUDY AND WRITING OF
HISTORY, at 383 (J. Rufus Fears ed., 1985).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may... ordain and establish").
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9 Rule of Law. No one, not even the Commander in Chief, is
above the law. Nor is an Zone, not even the lowliest prisoner, beneath
the protection of the law.
e Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances. The power
conferred on public institutions by the Constitution is divided in such a
way that the executive, legislative and judicial branches can each keep
watch over and rein in each other.
6
* Bill of Rights. Among other rights recognized for all, no "per-
son" (whether or not a citizen) may be "deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."
7
* Independent Judiciary. Federal judges are guaranteed inde-
pendence through a combination of life tenure, immunity from prose-
cution for judicial acts, a prohibition of salary cuts, and an ethical ban
on external interference.8
* Judicial Review of Constitutionality. The courts are empow-
ered to review the constitutionality of laws passed by Congress and
actions taken by the executive. The Supreme Court has the final say;
the other branches must obey its authoritative interpretation, unless
and until the Constitution is amended. 9
o Habeas Corpus. Except for battlefield exigencies, anyone de-
prived of liberty is entitled to have his case brought promptly before a
judge to determine whether the imprisonment is lawful and the treat-
ment humane. Habeas corpus may be suspended only in cases of rebel-
lion or invasion, and then only by Congress, not by the executive.l0
* International Law. Echoing the "decent respect for the opin-
ions of mankind" given voice in the Declaration of Independence,"
5 See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (discussing how
no one, including the President, is above the law).
6 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (granting the power of all impeach-
ments, including the President's, to Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the
President the power to appoint judges for the Supreme Court); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (granting the courts judicial review of all laws).
7 U.S.CONST. amend. V.
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting federal judges tenure "during good Be-
haviour" and prohibiting salary reductions "during their Continuance in Office").
9 Marbury, 5 U.S. 177-78.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The restriction on suspension of habeas corpus
appears in the article on legislative powers, implying that only Congress may sus-
pend the Great Writ.
11 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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the Constitution makes our duly ratified international treaties part of
the "supreme law of the land."'
12
The wisdom of these precepts is now confirmed, not only by our
own history, but also by their nearly universal adoption by interna-
tional human rights law and by the constitutional practice of other de-
mocracies. Among other relevant treaties, the United States has joined
most nations and nearly all democracies in ratifying the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires judicial review
of all detentions, 13 and the Convention against Torture, which prohib-
its not only torture, but also any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. 14
These treaties apply in war as well as in peace (although during
war they must be interpreted in light of the laws of war). 15 The Geneva
Conventions likewise require the status of a prisoner, in case of any
doubt, be reviewed by a "competent tribunal."'16 The Geneva Conven-
tions and elemental principles of the laws of war also prohibit torture
and other abuse.
17
In evaluating executive excesses in the treatment, interrogation,
detention and trial of suspects and captured combatants in the "war"
against terrorism, what is at stake is not only respect for the human
rights of the prisoners, but the very fabric of our system of the rule of
law. To the extent the Commander in Chief claims implicit "war pow-
ers" to act beyond the boundaries set by Congress, beyond review by
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
art. 9.4, Annex (Dec. 16, 1966), http://daccessdds.un.orgldoclRESOLUTION/GEN
/NR0/005/03/IMG/NR000503.pdf. One-hundred and fifty-five states are signatory-
parties as of Jan. 26, 2006, see http://www.ohchr.org/englishlcountries/ ratifica-
tion/3.htm.
14 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] G.A. Res.
39/46, arts. 2.2, 16.1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46/Annex (Dec. 10, 1984), http://dacces
sdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/460/23/IMG/NR046023.pdf. One-
hundred and forty-one states are signatory parties as of Jan. 26, 2006, see http:llwww
.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm.
15 E.g., id. at art. 2.2 (Convention Against Torture); Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. No. 131 at 41 (July 9), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/
imwpframe.htm.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 5,
Aug . 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
E.g., id. at art. 3.1(a), (c), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 (banning
"cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment.").
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independent courts, and beyond recognition of any rights for the pris-
oners, he champions the rule of men, not the rule of law. The good
intentions of the Commander in Chief are no substitute for checks and
balances. The framers understood this. So must we.
II. TORTURE AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS
International law unconditionally prohibits torture in all circum-
stances.18 For example, the Convention against Torture, to which the
U.S. is a party, makes clear: "No exceptional circumstances whatso-
ever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political insta-
bility or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture." 
1 9
However, until recent legislation enacted in December 2005, the
position of the Bush Administration was-and possibly remains- that
torture is prohibited by U.S. policy, but not by law in at least two cir-
cumstances.
First, against foreign citizens overseas. As late as December
2005, the Administration claimed that foreign citizens have no sub-
stantive rights under the United States Constitution when detained by
the U.S. outside our borders.2 1 By the government's logic, foreign citi-
zens detained outside the U.S. borders may legally be tortured.
The second circumstance in which the Administration asserts the
22legality of torture is in the "war" against terror. The government does
not concede that torture is legally barred when the President, acting as
Commander in Chief, determines torture is necessary to conduct war.
23
This argument debuted in the infamous August 2002 memorandum on
24torture from the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel. The
torture memo opined that any law or treaty purporting to bar the
Commander in Chief from authorizing torture would unconstitution-
ally infringe on his power to conduct war. 25 Although officially with-
18 Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 2.2.
19 Id.
20 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C.
2005).
21 Id.
22 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards
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drawn in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the December 2004 re-
placement memo, while correcting other flaws, expressly declined to
address this issue.26
Moreover, while U.S. policy bars torture, it does not prohibit the
use of other abusive techniques against foreign citizens abroad. 27 Un-
der the government's theory that foreign citizens overseas had no
rights at all, it followed they could legally be subjected to cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment. Thus, the government authorized and
28used techniques such as "waterboarding" (simulated drowning). In
the fall of 2005, during congressional consideration of a bill to ban
cruel, inhuman or degrading techniques, Vice President Dick Cheney
repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) lobbied Senator John McCain to ex-
empt the CIA.
29
These Administration positions were, in this author's judgment,
untenable in law. However, the legal landscape has now changed dra-
matically. In December 2005, with overwhelming bipartisan support,
Congress passed and the President signed the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005.30 The Act includes two provisions chiefly sponsored by Sena-
tor McCain, a former U.S. prisoner of war who was tortured by the
North Vietnamese. 31 The first provision effectively overrules the Ad-
ministration's claim that foreign citizens abroad have no legal rights,
by prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of anyone in
U.S. custody or physical control, "regardless of nationality or physical
location," and without any "geographical limitation."
32
Even so, the Administration still clings to its argument that Con-
gress could not constitutionally ban abusive techniques in the "war
against terror." 33 In signing the bill, the President stated that the execu-
26 Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Regarding
Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C., §§ 2340-2340A 2 (Dec. 30, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.
27 See generally, id.
28 Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01.
29 Eric Schmitt, Exception Sought in Detainee Abuse Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2005, at A16.
30 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1001, 119 Stat.
2680, 2739 (2005).
31 Josh White & Charles Babington, House Supports Ban on Torture; Meas-
ure Would Limit Interrogation Tactics, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at Al.
32 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1003.
33 Press Release, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the Dep't of
Def., Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005), http:// www.whitehouse
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tive branch would "construe" the ban on abusive techniques "in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief
and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial
power."
34
Although this statement is couched in legalese, the implication is
plain: our President refuses to unconditionally accept a congressional
ban on abusing prisoners, which, in turn, implements U.S. treaty obli-
gations under the Convention against Torture. 35 Under the theory pur-
portedly preserved by the President's signing statement, no source of
law, whether domestic or international, can restrain the presidential
exercise of an implied power as Commander in Chief to abuse prison-
ers in the course of a war. The effect of this claim of implied authority
to torture, despite statutory and treaty prohibitions, is to place the
President above the law. It will be so perceived abroad.
The second provision in the McCain bill gives specific guidance to
36the military, but it does not apply to the CIA. It mandates that no
prisoner in U.S. military custody or detained in a military facility be
subjected to any technique not authorized by the U.S. Army Field
Manual.37 According to news reports, an amended version of the Army
Field Manual, due for release in early 2006, will expressly ban such
techniques as forced nudity and use of dogs to intimidate prisoners.
38
This may help repair some of the damage done by the worldwide pub-
lication of photos of U.S. guards using snarling dogs to menace naked
prisoners at Abu Ghraib.39
The provision does not cover CIA interrogations (except when
conducted on a military base).40 CIA interrogations off-base are lim-
ited only by the general ban on "cruel, inhuman or degrading" tech-
niques.4' Unless the Justice Department concludes that forced nudity
and threatening dogs fall within this ban-which, one fears, it might
.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
34 Id.
35 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1003.
36 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1002.
37 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1002.
38 E. Schmitt, New Army Rules May Snarl Talks With McCain on Detainee
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at Al.
39 Greg Miller, Army Puts a New Face on Interrogations; The Military
Broadens Its Pool of Specialists and Retools Its Approach to Gathering Intelligence,
L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at Al.
40 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1002.
41 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1003.
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not4-nothing in the new law prohibits the CIA from using some of
the very techniques that made Abu Ghraib infamous.
Another provision in the new law authorizes "Combatant Status
Review Tribunal[s]" (administrative boards established by the military
to determine whether prisoners are enemy combatants) to consider
evidence exacted by "coercion," so long as the Tribunal deems it to
have "probative value. 4 3 Unless this provision is construed to require
the suppression of statements obtained by torture, this appears to vio-
late the U.S. treaty commitment under the torture convention, which
stipulates: "Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be in-
voked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused
of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
'"4
Many other nations routinely torture prisoners in fact, even though
they prohibit it in law.45 The U.S. is far from the most culpable coun-
try when it comes to abusing prisoners in practice. What stands out is
our unique claim of a legal right to do so. What other nation in the
world openly reserves the supposed right of its executive to authorize
torture, or of its military boards to consider evidence adduced by tor-
ture? None comes to mind. If the United States hopes to reclaim the
moral high ground in the battle for world public opinion, we will need
to do better.
I. PROLONGED ARBITRARY DETENTIONS AT GUANTANAMO
Among the most fundamental safeguards of human rights are due
process of law and the Great Writ-habeas corpus-which guarantees
prisoners the right to petition an independent court to review the law-
fulness of an executive detention.46 Yet, until rebuffed by the Supreme
42 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1003(d). The definition of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment is coterminous with that provided "by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments... as defined in the United States Reserva-
tions, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against
Torture." § 1003 (d).
43 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(b) (1).
44 Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 15.
45 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at arts. 2.2, 16.1 (Morocco,
Egypt, and Jordan are all contracting parties to the Convention Against Torture). But
see Priest, supra note 28, at A01, "years of State Department human rights reports
accuse all three of chronic prisoner abuse."




Court in 2004,4 7 the Administration claimed the right to imprison ter-
ror suspects at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-for
the duration of the "war" against terrorism without a right to judicial
review of their detention.48 Prisoners were detained solely on the basis
of secret intelligence information unknown to anyone outside the ex-
ecutive branch, without criminal charges, and with no access to law-
yers or courts, by habeas or otherwise.
49
That extraordinary claim-amounting to an executive prerogative
to impose what could be a life sentence of imprisonment, without due
process of law-astounded legal observers around the world. 50 Those
who share our common law heritage of habeas corpus were especially
distressed.51 In 2002, a British appeals court expressed "deep concern
that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, [a
prisoner at Guantanamo] may be subject to indefinite detention in ter-
ritory over which the United States has exclusive control with no op-
portunity to challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court
or tribunal. ' 52 The court termed Guantanamo a "legal black-hole.",
51
At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of re-
viewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest .... In England prior to 1789, in the Colo-
nies, and in this Nation during the formative years of our Government, the
writ of habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as well as to citi-
zens.
Id. (citations omitted) (holding Acts of Congress did not remove the jurisdic-
tion of the court over an alien's right of habeas corpus).
47 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) (holding that the aliens being
held indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay had the right for their habeas corpus claims to
be heard in the district court).
48 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004).
49 Id. "[T]he Government's most extreme rendition of this argument ...
[would] eliminate entirely any individual process." Id.
5o See Erwin Chemerinsky, Wartime Security and Constitutional Liberty:
Detainees, 68 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1120-22 (2005) (criticizing the Bush administra-
tion's attempt to deprive the Guantanamo Bay detainees of due process); Charles I.
Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule by Law: The Detention of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 225, 229 (2003) (expressing alarm at the use the executive power to hold
the Guantanamo Bay detainees and others without due process of law and denying
them the writ of habeas corpus).
51 See Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-
343), 2003 WL 22490562.
52 Abbasi v. Secretary of State, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [107], 2002 All
E.R. 70 (U.K. Ct. App.) (Eng.).
53 Id. at [64], 2002 All E.R. at 70.
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The following year Lord Steyn, a senior British Law Lord, pub-
licly condemned the detentions at Guantanamo as a "monstrous failure
of justice." 54 The very purpose of imprisoning people at Guantanamo,
he noted, was "to put them beyond the rule of law."
In an amicus brief before the United States Supreme Court, the
Commonwealth Lawyers Association, consisting of all law societies
and bar associations in the 53 Commonwealth member countries, ad-
vised that "if it were the United Kingdom and not the United States
which controlled ... Guantanamo ... English courts ... would as-
sume jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus .... We believe that
the same position would also apply [in the courts of] . . .any other
Commonwealth state."56
Hundreds of prisoners have been held at Guantanamo for periods
of up to four years. 57 During the first two years, they were afforded no
legal process at all. 58 Only after the Supreme Court granted review in
the Guantanamo cases did the Pentagon devise a system of reviews by
"combatant status review tribunals," followed by annual administra-
tive reviews of detentions.59 Yet these procedures fall short of the
minimum requirements of due process.
60
In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling 61 that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction to hear petitions, a more defensible review by independent
courts was sought by scores of habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf
Guantanamo detainees. Nevertheless, in the Detainee Treatment Act
54 Edward Alden, Guantanamo Bay's 'Moral Black Hole,' FINANCIAL TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2003, at 8.
55 Id.
56 Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, supra note 51, at 3.
57 Australian Newspaper Highlights, ASIA PULSE, Mar. 6, 2006, § Nationwide
International News.
58 High Court to Hear Case of Detainees Held at Base: Guantanamo Decision
Should Shed Light on Future of Bush's Anti-Terror Policies, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov.
11, 2003, at Al.
59 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Lawyer is Questioned Over Rights of Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A16.
60 See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454
(D.D.C. 2005).
61 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004).
62 First Post-Supreme Court Habeas Petitions Filed on Behalf of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, CCR Coordinates Law Firms to Secure Adequate Representation
of Detainees, http://www.ccr-ny.org/ v2/reports/report.asp?ObjlD=pQOvjcVXXK&
Content=406. See also Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 16, Anam v. Bush,
(D.D.C. July 14, 2004), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Yemeni%20




of 2005, Congress barred any further habeas petitions from Guan-
tanamo, substituting instead a more limited judicial review by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.63 Review will now be
confined to whether combatant status review tribunals are in compli-
ance with Pentagon procedures, and whether those procedures comply
with the U.S. Constitution and laws. 64 The issue of whether prisoners
have been tortured in violation of the Convention against Torture may
be ruled outside the permissible scope of judicial review. Whether the
new Act will force the dismissal of all the pending habeas petitions, as
the government now insists, remains to be seen.
65
Guantanamo has become a global symbol of American efforts to
bypass the rule of law in the "war" against terrorism. The new, con-
gressionally mandated judicial review is far better than the Admini-
stration's original claim of executive power to imprison people indefi-
nitely with no judicial review whatsoever. But will the new limitations
on judicial review prevent judges from overcoming that legacy of law-
lessness? The world will be watching.
IV. MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS
Hundreds of prisoners have been held at Guantanamo for years
without criminal charges or trials. 66 However, the Pentagon has re-
%207%202%2004.pdf; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9-10, Begg v. Bush,
(D.D.C. July 2, 2004), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2legal/docs/ DC%20Dist%2OBegg
%20Petition%207%202%2004.pdf; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, Khadr
v. Bush, (D.D.C. July 2, 2004), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/DC%2ODist%
20Khadr%2OPetition%207%202%2004.pdf; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at
13-14, Benchellali v. Bush, (D.D.C. July 6, 2004), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
docs/FiledBenchallali.pdf; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 14, Abdah v.
Bush, (D.D.C. July 27, 2004), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2legal/docs/Abdah%20
Habeas%20Petition%2004-1254.pdf; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10,
Boumediene v. Bush, (D.D.C. July 8, 2004), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
september llth/docs/Boumediene%20_HabeasPetitionDCDist_7_9_04.pdf; Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9-10, Almurbati v. Bush, (D.D.C. July 21, 2004),
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Bahraini% 20petition.pdf
63 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat.
2680, 2742 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
64 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e).
65 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(h); see also Neil Lewis, U.S. to
Seek Dismissal of Guantanamo Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at A11.
66 Anthony Harwood, Law v. War: US Court Lets Guantanamo Captives
Fight for Freedom, THE MIRROR (Eng.), June 29, 2004, at 2; see also U.S. Charges
10th Guantanamo Detainee, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at A10; see also Elaine
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ferred a handful of prisoners for trial by military commission. 67 Such
commissions have not been used since the World War II era.6 8 Among
other questionable procedures, and contrary to the practice in our
courts, the military commissions deny the accused and his civilian de-
fense counsel (if any) access to classified prosecution evidence, and
until recently, they also barred any appeal to the courts. 6 9 Because of
ongoing challenges in U.S. courts (now pending before the Supreme
Court), no military commission trials were actually conducted by year-
end 2005.70
Other democracies disdain these shortcut military trials. For exam-
ple, when the Pentagon proposed to prosecute several British prisoners
at Guantanamo, British Attorney General Peter Goldsmith called mili-
tary commission trials "unacceptable," adding "there are certain prin-
ciples on which there can be no compromise .... Fair trial is one of
those. ' 71 Throughout lengthy negotiations, Lord Goldsmith "would
not budge from a basic demand: that verdicts of military commissions
be reviewed by civilian courts." 72 Washington finally gave up, and
four British prisoners at Guantanamo were returned to Britain, where
they were released without being charged or tried.73
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 now provides for judicial re-
view, but only after a military commission trial has been fully con-
ducted.74 Based on the Act, the government has asked the Supreme
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TIMEs, July 28, 2004, at A5.
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68 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950) (holding enemy bel-
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otherwise. Id.
70 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004),
rev'd, 415 F. 3d 33 (D.C.Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 8222 (Nov. 7,
2005).
71 Reuters, Briton Condemns Proposed U.S. Trials, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2004, at A7.
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Court to drop its pretrial review of the first military commission case,
and to defer any potential review until after the trial and all military
reviews have been completed.75
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing review of torture, cruel treatment, prolonged arbi-
trary detentions and structurally unfair trials does not cover the full
range of U.S. excesses in responding to terrorism. Among other prac-
tices that appall even our friends are ghost prisons (whose locations
are kept secret), ghost prisoners (whose names and locations are un-
known, even to the Red Cross), and our extraordinary rendering of
prisoners to other countries known to engage in torture. 6 The cumula-
tive effect of these excesses has been to diminish American stature in
the world and to attain the seemingly unthinkable - to generate global
public sympathy for detained terrorists.
The resulting damage to American foreign policy was eloquently
articulated by a group of former U.S. diplomats in their amicus brief to
the Supreme Court in the Guantanamo case. They counsel against
the Administration's contention "that the executive branch may im-
prison whom it will and do so beyond the reach of due process of
law."78 That contention, they argue, "demeans and weakens this na-
tion's voice abroad. 79
It thereby also hands our enemies a victory on a vital moral, dip-
lomatic and political front in the "war" against terrorism. While hu-
man dignity does not hang on every change in judicial review proce-
dures, the universal conscience is offended by such egregious viola-
tions as torture, cruel treatment, prolonged detention without any legal
process, and military commission trials that shortcut basic standards of
fair trial. In the interest of both principle and pragmatism, the time has
come to renew and strengthen our national commitment to respect
human rights and dignity in the "war" against terrorism.
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76 Priest, supra note 28, at A01.
77 Brief of Diego Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners,
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) at 11.
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